## Introduction to Reinforcement Learning

## Lecture 4: POMDPs \& Multi-Agent RL

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(based on material from Frans Oliehoek, Tony Cassandra, Michael Littman, and Leslie Kaelbling)
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## Partial observability

- In a partially observable decision problem, the agent does not have access to the true state of the environment
- Instead agent receives only observations correlated with the state
- There are two possible causes of partial observability:
(1) Noisy sensors: many-to-many function mapping states to observations
(2) Perceptual aliasing: many-to-one mapping


## Hallway example



## Partially observable Markov decision processes

- POMDPs extend MDPs to model partial observability
- Environment is stationary and possibly stochastic environment
- A finite POMDP consists of:
- Discrete time $t=0,1,2, \ldots$
- A discrete set of states $s \in S$
- A discrete set of observations $o \in O$
- A discrete set of actions $a \in A$
- A transition model $p\left(s^{\prime} \mid s, a\right)$ : the probability of transitioning to state $s^{\prime}$ when the agent takes action $a$ at state $s$
- An observation model $p\left(o \mid s^{\prime}, a\right)$ : the probability of receiving an observation $o$ after taking action $a$ and landing in state $s^{\prime}$
- A reward function $R: S \times A \mapsto \mathbb{R}$, so that the agent receives reward $R(s, a)$ when it takes action $a$ at state $s$
- A planning horizon, which can be infinite


## MDPs $\subset$ POMDPs or POMDPs $\subset$ MDPs?

## POMDPs

## MDPs

MDPs

## POMDPs

## Tiger example (1)



## Tiger example (2)

- $S=\{L, R\}$
- $A=\{O L, O R, L i\}$
- $O=\{H L, H R\}$
- Transitions: state is static but opening resets
- Rewards:
- Correct door: +10
- Wrong door: -100
- Listen: - 1
- Observations: correct $85 \%$ of the time:
- $p(H L \mid L, L i)=0.85$
- $p(H R \mid L, L i)=0.15$
- $p(H L \mid R, L i)=0.15$
- $p(H R \mid R, L i)=0.85$


## Heuristic approaches

- Without Markov property, reactive policies are suboptimal
- Can sometimes settle for them anyway
- Or condition actions on:
- Entire history
- A fixed window of history
- An engineered subset of history
- An engineered higher-level observation


## Beliefs (1)

- Principled approaches formalise uncertainty about the state
- A belief is a probability distribution over states, conditioned on what the agent has observed: $b(s)=p(s)$



## Beliefs (2)

- Updating the belief requires knowledge of $b, T$, and $O$
- Start from Bayes rule:

$$
p(A \mid B)=\frac{p(A, B)}{p(B)}=\frac{p(B \mid A) p(A)}{p(B)}
$$

- In our case:

$$
p\left(s^{\prime} \mid o\right)=\frac{p\left(o \mid s^{\prime}\right) p\left(s^{\prime}\right)}{p(o)}
$$

- Adding other givens:

$$
p\left(s^{\prime} \mid o, a, b\right)=\frac{p\left(o \mid s^{\prime}, a, b\right) p\left(s^{\prime} \mid a, b\right)}{p(o \mid a, b)}
$$

## Beliefs (3)

- Expanding $p\left(s^{\prime} \mid a, b\right)$ :

$$
b^{\prime}\left(s^{\prime}\right)=\frac{p\left(o \mid a, s^{\prime}\right) \sum_{s} p\left(s^{\prime} \mid s, a\right) b(s)}{p(o \mid a, b)}
$$

- Where:

$$
p(o \mid a, b)=\sum_{s^{\prime}} p\left(o \mid a, s^{\prime}\right) \sum_{s} p\left(s^{\prime} \mid s, a\right) b(s)
$$

## Beliefs (4)



## Most likely state

- Solve underlying MDP
- Condition actions on most likely state

$$
\pi_{M L S}=\underset{a}{\arg \max } Q\left(s_{M L}, a\right)
$$

where:

$$
s_{M L}=\underset{s}{\arg \max } b(s)
$$

## $Q_{M D P}$

- Solve underlying MDP, select action with best expected value:

$$
\pi_{Q M D P}=\underset{a}{\arg \max } Q(b, a)
$$

where:

$$
Q(b, a)=\sum_{s} Q(s, a) b(s)
$$

- Suppose $b\left(s_{1}\right)=0.75, b\left(s_{2}\right)=0.25$, and $Q(s, a)$ is:

|  | $s_{1}$ | $s_{2}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $a_{1}$ | 100 | 100 |
|  | 101 | 0 |
|  |  |  |

- Will most likely state or $Q_{M D P}$ yield a higher expected return?


## Belief MDPs

- Belief is a sufficient statistic for history
- Therefore, we can define a belief MDP:
- States are beliefs in the POMDP: $s_{B M D P}=b\left(s_{P O M D P}\right)$
- Rewards are expectations wrt $b: R(b, a)=\sum_{s} b(s) R(s, a)$
- Belief update happens in environment: $p\left(b^{\prime} \mid b_{t}, a_{t}, o_{t}\right)=1$ iff $b^{\prime}=b_{t+1}$
- Automatically balance reward and information gathering
- Belief MDP has continuous state: belief vector has length $\left|S_{\text {POMDP }}\right|$
- Fortunately, the value function is piecewise-linear and convex
- What prevents convenient delusions?


## Policy trees



## POMDP value functions

- Value function of $t$-step policy tree $\pi$ :

$$
V^{\pi}(s)=R(s, a)+\gamma \sum_{s^{\prime}} p\left(s^{\prime} \mid s, a_{\pi}\right) \sum_{o} p\left(o \mid s^{\prime}, \pi_{a}\right) V^{\pi_{o}}\left(s^{\prime}\right)
$$

where $\pi_{o}$ is the $(t-1)$-step policy subtree of $\pi$ associated with $o$

- But we need value functions over beliefs, not states:

$$
V^{\pi}(b)=\sum_{s \in S} b(s) V^{\pi}(s)
$$

- For compactness, we write the state-value function as an $\alpha$-vector $\alpha_{\pi}=\left\langle V_{\pi}\left(s_{1}\right), \ldots, V_{\pi}\left(s_{|S|}\right)\right\rangle$ such that:

$$
V^{\pi}(b)=b \cdot \alpha_{\pi}
$$

- The optimal value function is thus:

$$
V^{*}(b)=\max _{\pi} b \cdot \alpha_{\pi}
$$

## Piecewise-linear convex value functions



## POMDP action selection



## Dominated policy trees



## POMDP value functions in 3D



## POMDP planning

- Value iteration [Sondik 1971, Monahan 1982]
- Given set $\Pi_{t-1}$ of undominated $(t-1)$-step policy trees
- Construct all $|A|\left|\Pi_{t-1}\right|^{|O|} t$-step policy trees by extension
- Prune dominated policy trees to form $\Pi_{t}$
- Faster: linear support [Chang 1988] \& Witness [Cassandra et al. 1997]
- Approximate: point-based value iteration [Pineau et al. 2003]
- More scalable: on-line POMDP planning [Ross et al. 2008]


## Infinite horizon planning

- Infinite horizon POMDP planning is undecidable!
- Optimal value function may have infinite facets
- Finite horizon planning may still converge for large $t$
- Yields finite state machine, e.g., infinite horizon tiger for $b_{0}=0.5,0.5$ :



## Bayes-optimal reinforcement learning

- Problem of learning in an MDP is cast as one of planning in a POMDP where the hidden state corresponds to the unknown model parameters: $s_{P O M D P}=\left(s_{M D P}, T, R\right)$
- Like any other POMDP, this POMDP can be treated like a belief MDP: $s_{B M D P}=b\left(s_{P O M D P}\right)$
- However, since $s_{M D P}$ is directly observed, only a belief over $T$ and $R$ is necessary, thus:

$$
s_{B M D P}=b\left(s_{P O M D P}\right)=b\left(s_{M D P}, T, R\right)=\left(s_{M D P}, b(T, R)\right)
$$

## DRQN [Hausknecht \& Stone 2015]



## Deep Variational RL [lgl et al. 2018]



## VariBAD [Zintgraf et al. 2019]



## Multi-Agent Paradigm



## Multi-Agent Systems are Everywhere



## Types of Multi-Agent Systems

- Cooperative:
- Shared team reward
- Coordination problem
- Competitive:
- Zero-sum games
- Individual opposing rewards
- Minimax equilibria
- Mixed:
- General-sum games
- Nash equilibria
- What is the question? [Shoham et al. 2007]


## Coordination Problems are Everywhere



## Setting


(Figure by Jakob Foerster)

## Multi-Agent MDP

- All agents see the global state $s$
- Individual actions: $u^{a} \in U$
- State transitions: $P\left(s^{\prime} \mid s, \mathbf{u}\right): S \times \mathbf{U} \times S \rightarrow[0,1]$
- Shared team reward: $r(s, \mathbf{u}): S \times \mathbf{U} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$
- Equivalent to an MDP with a factored action space


## Dec-POMDP

- Observation function: $O(s, a): S \times A \rightarrow Z$
- Action-observation history: $\tau^{a} \in T \equiv(Z \times U)^{*}$
- Decentralised policies: $\pi^{a}\left(u^{a} \mid \tau^{a}\right): T \times U \rightarrow[0,1]$
- Natural decentralisation: communication and sensory constraints
- Artificial decentralisation: improve tractability
- Centralised learning of decentralised policies


## The Predictability / Exploitation Dilemma

- Exploitation:
- Maximising performance requires collecting reward
- In a single-agent setting, this requires exploiting observations
- Predictability:
- Dec-POMDP agents cannot explicitly communicate
- Coordination requires predictability: "stick to the plan!"
- Predictability can require ignoring private information

When does the benefit of exploiting private observations outweigh the cost in predictability?

## Independent Learning

- Independent $Q$-learning [Tan 1993]
- Each agent learns independently with its own $Q$-function
- Treats other agents as part of the environment
- Independent actor-critic [Foerster et al. 2018]
- Each agent learns independently with its own actor-critic
- Treats other agents as part of the environment
- Speed learning with parameter sharing
- Different inputs, including a, induce different behaviour
- Still independent: value functions condition only on $\tau^{a}$ and $u^{a}$
- Limitations:
- Nonstationary learning
- Hard to learn to coordinate


## Centralised Critics [Lowe et al. 2017; Foerster et al. 2018]

Centralised $V(s, \boldsymbol{\tau})$ or $Q(s, \boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{u}) \rightarrow$ hard greedification $\rightarrow$ actor-critic


## Factored Joint Value Functions

- Factored value functions [Guestrin et al. 2003] can improve scalability:

$$
Q_{t o t}(\tau, \mathbf{u} ; \boldsymbol{\theta})=\sum_{e=1}^{E} Q_{e}\left(\tau^{e}, \mathbf{u}^{e} ; \theta^{e}\right)
$$

where each $e$ indicates a subset of the agents


## Value Decomposition Networks [Sunehag et al., 2017]

- Most extreme factorisation: one per agent:

$$
Q_{t o t}(\tau, \mathbf{u} ; \boldsymbol{\theta})=\sum_{a=1}^{N} Q_{a}\left(\tau^{a}, u^{a} ; \theta^{a}\right)
$$



## Decentralisability

- Added benefit of decentralising the max and arg max:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\max _{\mathbf{u}} Q_{t o t}(\tau, \mathbf{u} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}) & =\sum \max _{u^{a}} Q_{a}\left(\tau^{a}, u^{a} ; \theta^{a}\right) \\
\underset{\mathbf{u}}{\arg \max } Q_{t o t}(\tau, \mathbf{u} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}) & =\left(\begin{array}{c}
\arg \max _{u^{1}} Q_{1}\left(\tau^{1}, u^{1} ; \theta^{1}\right) \\
\vdots \\
\arg \max _{u^{n}} Q_{n}\left(\tau^{n}, u^{n} ; \theta^{n}\right)
\end{array}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

- No more hard greedification $\Longrightarrow Q$-learning, not actor-critic:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) & =\sum_{i=1}^{b}\left[\left(y_{i}^{\text {tot }}-Q_{t o t}(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{u} ; \boldsymbol{\theta})\right)^{2}\right] \\
y_{i}^{\text {tot }} & =r_{i}+\gamma \max _{\mathbf{u}^{\prime}} Q_{t o t}\left(\boldsymbol{\tau}_{i}^{\prime}, \mathbf{u}^{\prime} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}^{-}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## QMIX's Monotonicity Constraint

To decentralise max / arg max, it suffices to enforce: $\frac{\partial Q_{\text {tot }}}{\partial Q_{a}} \geq 0, \forall a \in A$


## Representational Capacity



## Bootstrapping



$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) & =\sum_{i=1}^{b}\left[\left(y_{i}^{\mathrm{tot}}-Q_{t o t}(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{u}, s ; \boldsymbol{\theta})\right)^{2}\right] \\
y_{i}^{\mathrm{tot}} & =r_{i}+\gamma \max _{\mathbf{u}^{\prime}} Q_{t o t}\left(\tau_{i}^{\prime}, \mathbf{u}^{\prime}, s^{\prime} ; \boldsymbol{\theta}^{-}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Two-Step Game



## Two-Step Game Results

| Ground Truth | A | A | B | A | A | B | A | A | B |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 7 | 7 |  | 7 | 7 |  | 0 | 1 |
|  | B | 8 | 8 | B | 7 | 7 | B | 1 | 8 |
|  |  | A | B |  | A | B |  | A | B |
| VDN | A | 6.94 | 6.94 | A | 6.99 | 7.02 | A | -1.87 | 2.31 |
|  | B | 6.35 | 6.36 | B | 6.99 | 7.02 | B | 2.33 | 6.51 |
|  |  | A | B |  | A | B |  | A | B |
| QMIX | A | 6.93 | 6.93 | A | 7.00 | 7.00 | A | 0.00 | 1.00 |
|  | B | 7.92 | 7.92 | B | 7.00 | 7.00 | B | 1.00 | 8.00 |
|  | State 1 |  |  |  |  | 2 A |  | State 2B |  |

## QMIX [Rashid et al. 2018]



- Agent network: represents $Q_{i}\left(\tau^{a}, u^{a} ; \theta^{a}\right)$
- Mixing network: represents $Q_{t o t}(\tau)$ using nonnegative weights
- Hypernetwork: generates weights of hypernetwork based on global s


## Random Matrix Games (The Students Were Right)



## StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge (SMAC)

[Samvelyan et al. 2019]


> https://github.com/oxwhirl/smac https://github.com/oxwhirl/pymarl

## Partial Observability in SMAC



$$
\text { Cyan }=\text { sight range } \quad \text { Red }=\text { shooting range }
$$

## SMAC Maps

| Name | Ally Units | Enemy Units |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2s3z | 2 Stalkers \& 3 Zealots | 2 Stalkers \& 3 Zealots |
| 3s5z | 3 Stalkers \& 5 Zealots | 3 Stalkers \& 5 Zealots |
| 1 c 3 s 5 z | 1 Colossus, 3 Stalkers \& 5 Zealots | 1 Colossus, 3 Stalkers \& 5 Zealots |
| 5m_vs_6m | 5 Marines | 6 Marines |
| 10m_vs_11m | 10 Marines | 11 Marines |
| 27m_vs_30m | 27 Marines | 30 Marines |
| 3s5z_vs_3s6z | 3 Stalkers \& 5 Zealots | 3 Stalkers \& 6 Zealots |
| MMM2 | 1 Medivac, 2 Marauders \& 7 Marines | 1 Medivac, 3 Marauders \& 8 Marines |
| 2s_vs_1sc | 2 Stalkers | 1 Spine Crawler |
| 3s_vs_5z | 3 Stalkers | 5 Zealots |
| 6h_vs_8z | 6 Hydralisks | 8 Zealots |
| bane_vs_bane | 20 Zerglings \& 4 Banelings | 20 Zerglings \& 4 Banelings |
| 2c_vs_64zg | 2 Colossi | 64 Zerglings |
| corridor | 6 Zealots | 24 Zerglings |

## Overall Results (The Students Were Right)

All Maps


- IQL
- COMA
- VDN
- QMIX


## State Ablations



## Linear Ablations



## Learned Mixing Functions (2c_vs_64zg)



$$
t=0
$$


$t=50$

## Multi-Layer Linear Mixing (Regression)



## Multi-Layer Linear Mixing (SMAC)




## Tanh Activation



## QMIX Takeaways

- Value function factorisation is crucial
- Flexible conditioning on central state is crucial
- Richly parameterised mixing is crucial
- Nonlinear mixing is not crucial (on SMAC)


## Whiteson Research Lab



